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THE GHOST OF CROWELL V. BENSON AND
THE RESIDUAL ROLE OF JUDGES AND AGENCIES
UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Linda R. Hirshman /
I preface this address with the caveat that my work in
the administrative law area is an outgrowth of the material
I teach in my seminar on the federal courts. Accordingly,
my experience and focus has been on the federpl system,
which has particular characteristics, such as the life-
tenured, salary-protected judiciary, which translate only
imperfectly into the state systems. Such as they are, the
translations are two, I think: One, insofar as state
constitutions are modeled on the federal, the separation of
powers concerns are analogous. Two, insofar as the states
have used as their model for the provision of judicial
review of administrative decis n-mdking, the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, - the concerns of the relative
roles of administrators and judges may be compared between
the systems.
With this caveat, there are, it seems to me, two major
areas of inquiry in discussing these topics. One is the
question of the overall legitimacy of the agency decision-
making. This is the issue of the ghost of Crowell v. Benson.
As I will ultimately conclude, haunting as the vision is,
the courts are unlikely to resurrect Crowell to the point of
killing off the governmental developments of the last fifty
years. That being the case, the somewhat more interesting
question is what the proper division of the business of
decision-making should be between the two legitimate struc-
tures. This is the subject of my longer piece, "Postmodern 3/
Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion",
and a subject I will address in abbreviated form today.
1/ Associate Professor of Law, I.I.T. Chicago-Kent College
of Law. A.B. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University
of Chicago.
2/ 5 U.S.C. Section 551 et sea. (1982).
3/ Nw. L. Rev. (1988) (forthcoming).
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Crowell v. Benson 4 was, of course, the Supreme
Court's most serious attack on the legitimacy of the admin-
istrative state. The agency involved happened to be the
federal Employees' Compensation Commission, which was
charged with enforcement of the federal employment compensa-
tion scheme for seamen. The ultimate federal authority to
prescribe compensation rested on the workers' relationship
to the navigable waters of the United States. While the
Court declined to find that the entire agency scheme was
unconstitutional as encroaching on the Article III powers of
the federal judges, it did hold that the Court could review
de novo not only the questions of law normally entrusted to
a reviewing court but also the "constitutional facts"
underlying the exercise of the agency's jurisdiction. (The
Court exercised traditional review of the facts of damage,
etc. for support in the agency's record.)
Although Crowell seemed to portend a serious restriction
on the agencies in the name of separation of powers, in
fact, the Court never followed up on the restrictive impli-
cations in the case, and the growth of the administrative
state is now beyond cavil. To paraphrase the immortal words
of former Supreme Court candidate Judge Robert Bork, one
reason not to be afraid of the ghost of Crowell v. Benson is
that once legal developments become sufficiently embedded in
the society, the Supreme Court is not going to attack them
broadside.
Although basically accepting these events, it is true
that the Court has thrice in the last four years addressed
the question of legislative encroachment on the Article III
Courts, striking down the newly created bankruptcy bench in
NorthQn Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., :/ but sustaining schemes to assign judge-like functions
to non-Art le III tribunals in Thomas v. Union Carbide Aaric.
Prod. Co.. and Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor. L1 Northern Pipeline resulted from the creation of
non-life-tenured/salary-protected judges to administer the
bankruptcy system, which previously had been administered by
4/ 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
5/ 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
6/ 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
7/ 106 S.Ct. 3245 (1986).
referees subject to de novo review by the federal district
judges. Although the decision had the consequence of
voiding the new bankruptcy scheme, what made the decision
peculiar is that it involved the decision of a matter of
contract, ordinarily subject to state law, and the two
judges whb concurred to make a bare majority of five rested
their opinions solely on the invalidity of allocating a
state law matter to a non-Article III tribunal.
The fragility of the Northern Pipeline decision became
immediately apparent when, two years later, the Court
addressed the issue again in Thomas. Thomas involved the
assignment to an arbitrator of the value of data sharing
among chemical companies trying to qualify their insecticides
for federal approval. Although the value of the data
closely resembles a trade secret, the Court found that it
could be assigned away from the courts without violating
Article III, because the legislation had already taken away
the trade secret protection, and, in any case, the arbitra-
tion arrangement was essential to the functioning of the
federal statutory scheme.
The Court further weakened the significance of Northern
Pipeline in Schor. There, the statutory scheme offered
people with a complaint against their commodities' brokers
the option of pursuing reparations before an administrative
tribunal or the federal court. Having opted for the tribunal,
the customer found himself defending the brokers' counterclaim
for breach of contract for commissions. Despite the analogy
to the state contract claim in Northern Pipeline, the
Supreme Court sustained the assignment to the agency,
emphasizing the voluntariness of the initial decision to
submit to the administrative agency and the lack of Congres-
sional intent in the scheme to overreach at the expense of
the courts.
These latter two decisions and the generally predictable
behavior of the federal courts leads me to conclude that the
legitimacy of the administrative state is pretty much beyond
challenge either from this earth or the great beyond.
Having established your legitimacy, I turn to the
question of more interest to me, of the proper role of the
legitimate agencies and courts when confronted with the
business of tribunals: finding fact, interpreting law and
implementing social policy. As I indicated at the outset,
once the legitimacy of agency decision-making under the
Constitution is established, the remaining relationship
develops largely by application of the federal Administrative
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Procedure Act. 1 / Under that scheme and the cases since the
passage of the Act in 1947, the courts basically leave to
the agencies the finding of fact; even when meddling in
factual matters the court pays homage to the virtue of
agency decision-making by allegedly directingg0ts concern
with the relationship of fact to conclusion. - The hard
questions arise, it seems to me, in the areas of interpreta-
tion and policy-making. They arise, of course, because
Congress' commands are imperfectly directive and produce the
perennial problem of who is to supply the missing meaning.
Almost since the beginning of the administrative state,
the precedents have reflected a duality, one line of cases
favoring heavy deference to the agencies and another,
simultaneous, inconsistent body of law advocating de novo
judicial determination of the meaning of the statutory
commands. The situation grew more pressing with the advent
of deregulation, wherein agencies were found to be reversing
their positions without any change in the wording of the
statutory mandate. Confronted with the ultimate in statutory
flexibility, theorists responded by advocating the revival
of the non-delegation doctrine to force Congress to clarify
the legislative will; a later school of thought advocated
broad deference to agency decision-making on the theory that
even an agency was more representative than a federal court.
Like their counterparts in the area of judicial review of
legislation, the jurisprudence scholars of administrative
review thus greatly down-played the role of the courts.
The argument for extreme deference got a shot in the
arm a couple of years ago when Justice Stevens made it the
central theme of his decision in ChevronU''S.A.. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. L/ Affirming the
EPA's revision of its standard for calculating certain
emissions under the Clean Air Act, the Court asserted that
where Congress failed in its statute to address the specific
question presented, the court would defer to any reasonable
interpretation the agency put forth. Justice Stevens
justified assigning the agency the role of statutory inter-
pretation on the grounds that even an administrative agency
8/ 5 U.S.C. Section 551 et sea. (1982).
9/ Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
10/ 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
was more politically responsible than a life-tenured federal
court.
I think this is a mistake. At least in the federal
sphere, where the judges are protected from the political
winds by the Constitutional requirements of life tenure and
salary guarantees, the ultimate judgment on the permission
and requirements of Co iuess' dictates should continue to
rest with the courts.
I make this contention for several reasons. First,
while the cases I discussed in the beginning of this paper
establish the legitimacy of the administrative state in face
of separation of powers arguments, the threat to the continued
separation of powers increases greatly if statutory interpre-
tation, as well as fact finding and technical expertise are
allotted to the Wncies. Second, courts are by Constitu-
tional mandate, as well as by experience and training,
suited to the task of wresting meaning from inadequately
expressive texts. Third, the courts can play a role in
adding to the legislative and administrative process a
concern for the public-regarding nature of legislation which
recent scholarship has shown to be particularly relevant.
Finally, to ask courts to defer to an administrative reading
of a statute the courts consider to be reasonable, but
wrong, is strongly counter-intuitive, and recent scholarshji/
has indicated, not surprisingly, that it's not happening.
11/ It is, of course, the guarantees of Article III that
mark the greatest distinction between the federal system,
which has been the focus of my inquiry, and the state
systems, which, like the state court systems, do the lion's
share of the business of governing. Accordingly, the caveat
in the text is not an insubstantial one.
12/ "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
13/ Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial
Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
554 (1986), citing D. Mueller, Public Choice (1979).
14/ Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
1986 Admin. L. Rev. 363; Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat
Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 1 (1986).
This is not to say that the administrators have no role
to play. Rather, their expertise, both technical and in
their real world experience of the way particularly social
or economic segments operate is critical to the court's
enlightened execution of their task.
Conclusion
So, administrative law judges, I come to you with bad
news and good news. The good news is that you're legitimate.
The bad news is that you're not running the farm.
